HTML Entity Encoder & Symbols Cheat Sheet

Professional HTML entity encoding, decoding, and XSS escaping workspace with support for named (&), decimal (&), hex (&), and categorized symbol reference tables.

Pure Client-Side Local Memory Processing · Zero Data Upload

Usage Guide

  • 1. Paste raw text, HTML markup, or entity-encoded strings into the input panel.
  • 2. Select an encoding format: Named Entities (&), Decimal (&), Hexadecimal (&), or XSS Safe Escaping.
  • 3. Copy the converted string or browse the Symbols Cheat Sheet to look up currency, math, arrow, and Greek character entities.

Security & Privacy Guarantee

  • 1. Full adherence to W3C HTML5 Named Character References specification.
  • 2. XSS Mode accurately escapes high-risk delimiters (<, >, &, ", ', /) to prevent script injection in HTML text contexts.
  • 3. Instant local browser computation without external API dependencies, keeping sensitive code private.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: Why can't raw < and > characters be written directly in HTML text?
A: In HTML syntax, < and > are reserved as tag delimiters. Unescaped brackets confuse the HTML parser, causing formatting errors or unexpected DOM tree nodes. They must be escaped as &lt; and &gt;.
Q: What is the difference between Named Entities and Numeric (Decimal/Hex) Entities?
A: Named entities (like &copy;) are human-readable shortcuts assigned to common glyphs. Numeric entities (like &#169; or &#xa9;) represent any valid code point across the entire Unicode character set.
Q: Why is HTML entity encoding alone not sufficient to prevent all XSS vulnerabilities?
A: HTML entity encoding protects text nodes inside HTML bodies. However, inside script block tags, href='javascript:...' attributes, or event handlers, attackers can execute code through different evaluation contexts requiring context-specific sanitization.
Q: How do I display raw HTML source code cleanly inside technical documentation or Markdown?
A: Escape angle brackets into &lt; and &gt;. This allows browsers to render the tags as visible text instead of executing them as live DOM elements.